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Comparing Cyber Defense Alternatives Using Rare-Event Simulation Techniques
to Compute Network Risk
Alexander Leon Krall
Supervising Professor: Michael E. Kuhl
Vulnerabilities inherent in a cyber network can be exploited by individuals with ma-
licious intent. Thus, machines on the network are at risk. Formally, security specialists
seek to mitigate the risk of intrusion events through network reconfiguration and defense.
Comparison between configuration alternatives may be difficult if an event is sufficiently
rare; risk estimates may of be questionable quality making definitive inferences unattain-
able. Furthermore, that which constitutes a “rare” event can imply different rates of occur-
rence, depending on network complexity. To measure rare events efficiently without the
risk of doing damage to a cyber network, special rare-event simulation techniques can be
employed, such as splitting or importance sampling. In particular, importance sampling
has shown promise when modeling an attacker moving through a network with intent to
steal data. The importance sampling technique amplifies certain aspects of the network in
order to cause a rare event to happen more frequently. Output statistics collected under
these amplified conditions must then be scaled back to the context of the original network
to produce meaningful results. This thesis successfully tailors the importance sampling
methodology to scenarios where an attacker must search a network. Said tailoring takes
the attacker’s successes and failures as well as the attacker’s targeting choices into account.
The methodology is shown to be more computationally efficient and can produce higher
quality estimates of risk when compared to standard simulation.
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In an increasingly digitized world, the need for secure systems has become a paramount
concern. Every cyber network has inherent vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by ma-
licious agents. The modern cyber-attacker has various scopes of intent: some seek to steal
protected data while others may simply want to demonstrate their prowess. Additionally,
hacking may be fueled by a political agenda; such a practice is known as hacktivism. Re-
gardless of their motivation, the cumulative actions of all attackers result in outstanding
financial loss. For example, time must be taken to fix damaged systems, intellectual prop-
erty can be stolen and distributed, etc. To mitigate these financial impacts, security spe-
cialists actively work to protect their networks. Thus, specialists and cyber-attacks are at
odds with each other in a battle of wits. The ensuing conflict results in the application of
complex tactics and stratagem as each side attempts to gain the upper hand [21]. One of
the possible outcomes of these struggles is that an attacker fulfills their intent, which will
affect the targeted institution. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
represents the synthesis of an adverse impact and its associated likelihood of occurrence as
network risk. More formally, risk measures the extent by which an entity is threatened by
a potential circumstance or event [17].
Overall, the implied goal of a security specialist is to minimize network risk to the
greatest degree possible. Such a feat can be done by making changes to a networks config-
uration or implementing defensive measures. Both approaches either change or obfuscate
1
the set of actions available to an attacker. To this end, being able to decipher a network’s





A cyber network topology has the potential to be highly complex. Machines on the network
may be highly interconnected or buried several layers beneath public visibility. Given such
a network, there may be numerous opportunities to bring malicious intent to fruition. For
example, a network can simultaneously be vulnerable to a worm attack or data theft. Within
the scope of data-theft, there may be multiple databases to consider, each with their own
associated risk of unauthorized data exfiltration. The difficulty in determining the risk of
each data-theft event has the possibility to scale with a networks complexity. An additional
layer of stochasticity becomes apparent when considering an attackers approach to com-
promising a network. Different attackers may utilize different strategies to move between
machines on a network. Thus, manually determining the risk of various events may become
time consuming and invoke additional expenses. Manual determination of risk would in-
volve leveraging real attacks on the network. Any damage done to a network in the midst
of testing would need to be repaired. To this end, an analytic technique for determining
network risk is much preferred. Said risk tool should be able to handle the aforementioned
sources of stochasticity while providing an efficient and cost-effective means of analyzing
a network. The potential benefits of an analytic risk calculation tool will be addressed by
this thesis.
The first thesis objective concerns the development of an analytic risk calculation tech-
nique. The technique will be able to determine the risk associated with various events of
3
interest. For the purposes of this investigation, events of interest will be limited to the scope
of attackers achieving machine access. The technique should be placed into an abstract
framework that is compatible with a variety of cyber network topologies. Since likelihood
and impact are pertinent to the calculation of risk, the design objective of the framework
will be to determine each of these metrics.
The second thesis objective entails implementing the theoretical framework. Realistic
and complex network topologies should be fed into the model during testing. To satisfy the
requirement of a complex system, subnets within the larger network should have machines
that are highly interconnected. Doing so should ensure that the framework is functional
and suitable for general usage. Depth and breadth-based search methods are two divergent
network movement techniques that can be utilized by attackers and should be investigated.
Additionally, the effects of network reconfiguration alternatives should be explored. These
alternatives could include the addition of new machines and the removal of connections.
The model should be developed as custom-made software.
The third, and final, thesis objective surrounds experimentation. Two contrasting meth-
ods should be used to validate the benefits of the model framework against standard pro-
cedures. The first method should involve a static number of trials. Under this validation
method, the confidence intervals of the risk output can be compared to determine which
procedure produces estimates of higher quality. The second validation method should as-
sess the number of trials needed to converge on an estimate of predetermined quality. The
number of trials required for convergence for each procedure indicates the required com-
putational effort required. Thus, the procedure that requires fewer trials is the procedure




This section discusses the relevant related work on network risk, risk reduction, and rare-
event simulation. The section opens by providing additional depth to the notion of risk.
Following this discussion, focus is placed on means to mitigate a network’s risk. After-
wards, rare-event simulation techniques, as they pertain to risk reduction, are explored.
The section closes with an analysis of the various techniques.
3.1 Network Risk
Risk is considered to be the synthesis of the likelihood and impact of an event. Each of these
two constituents have their own unique qualities to consider. However, additional measures
may be recorded alongside risk. McQueen et al. [11] identify the time to compromise a
target as a potential metric to track since it represents a measure of effort expended by an
attacker . In their study on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems,
the time to compromise a machine is related to the same machine’s risk. As a machine’s
risk decreases, its time to compromise increases [11].
3.1.1 Likelihood
Likelihood is said to be contingent on three factors that are related to the attacker. These
factors include the attacker’s intent, capability, and targeting [17]. An attacker’s intent
describes what an attacker seeks to accomplish during an assault on a network. Capability
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describes the skillset associated with a particular attacker. Targeting pertains to the ways
in which an attacker moves through a network. Additionally, there is a temporal nature
attached to likelihood; the likelihood of an event of interest is taken with respect to a given
period of time [13, 17]. However, if an event is certain to occur, the known frequency of
occurrence can be used in lieu of likelihood [17]. Each action performed by an attacker is
attached to a given duration of execution. According to DELL, these actions will fall within
one of twelve categories that lie in a twelve-step sequence, known as a kill chain [5]. To
determine the time consumed by each of these steps, Rege et al. [16] utilized a red team
vs. blue team style event. During such an event, a team of attackers (red team) attempt to
infiltrate a network defended by a team of security specialists (blue team). Rege et al. [16]
obtained a preliminary finding of the temporal breakdown of the attack phases over the
course of each day, with system exploitation taking up roughly 44% of the available time
and reconnaissance taking up 42% of the time. Note that in such an event, a maximum time
threshold is predetermined. An attacker, if sufficiently tenacious, could leverage an attack
indefinitely. Baiardi et al. [1] found that an attack horizon of three days yielded the most
useful data. Similarly, Rege et al.utilized an attack horizon of four days in their study [16].
Inevitably, the occurrence of an event of interest will be dependent on the attacker suc-
cessfully compromising other machines on a network. To do so, the attacker must exploit
vulnerabilities present on a series of target machines. A vulnerability is defines as a defect
in a component or an erroneous or malicious behavior performed by a user [1]. These vul-
nerabilities vary in their severity and are given ratings by the Common Vulnerability Scor-
ing System (CVSS). These scores are assigned on a scale from one to ten, where higher
scores indicated an increased probability of exploitation [2]. CVSS does not account for
unknown vulnerabilities [2]. CVSS version 3 contains four primary metrics: access vector
(AV), access complexity (AC), privileges required (PReq), and user interaction (UI) [22].
AV refers to the context in which the vulnerability exploitation is feasible. AC describes
conditions that are beyond an attacker’s control. PReq reflects the level of privileges an
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attacker must acquire prior to exploiting a vulnerability successfully. UI describes any
interaction required from a user that is not the attacker [22]. FIRST details an explicit
methodology by which each of these metrics can be gauged [7]. Note that CVSS version
3 also assesses the possibility of a change in scope. Should the attacker be able to affect a
component whose authority is different than the vulnerable component, the scope is con-
sidered to be changed [7]. A change in scope has the potential to affect the PR metric [22].
The presence of multiple points of entry to a cyber network will also affect the likeli-
hood that events of interest occur. An event may be more or less likely depending on an
attacker’s starting position relative to the rest of the network. Thus, any risk assessments
must consider the likelihoods associated with all potential points of entry that an attacker
can utilize [13].
3.1.2 Impact
The impacts that result from cyber attacks come in various forms. These types can be
listed as follows: confidentiality - the exfiltration of sensitive information; integrity - the
placement of an asset into a non-recoverable state; and availability - the placement of an
asset into a temporarily inaccessible state [13, 17]. Additionally, impact can determined
with respect to financial damages as a means to generate a more objective comparison
[13]. Nonetheless, the measurement of impact is often statically determined by a given
institution, according to NIST [17]. MITRE assesses impact with respect to cost, technical
performance, and scheduling. Each category is ranked from minimal to severe on a one to
five scale. The aggregate of each category’s score is utilized as the event’s numeric impact
score [12]. Said method for determining impact is know as the program risk management
assessment scale [12].
Given the possibility for multiple events of interest, NIST states that a vector of impacts
can be utilized to assess events of interest separately [17]. Once the impact and likelihood
vectors for all events of interest become available, they can be combined to obtain a single
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risk vector. Said risk vector can then be analyzed by security specialists when exploring
risk reduction options.
3.2 Risk Reduction
Security specialists seek to employ any number of means to reduce network risk. The
removal of attack paths is one of various such means [15]. Minimizing the pairwise con-
nectivity between machines on the network is one means to carry forth this intuition. Dinh
et al. [6] developed an optimization method to carry forth this purpose in networks with
uncertainty. Sensor technology can generate alerts when certain actions are performed on
a network. Use of these alerts and knowledge of a network’s attack graph can be utilized to
correlate isolated alerts into attack scenarios [20]. Wang et al. [20] utilize a queue graph ap-
proach to generate this correlation. Additionally, said method can hypothesize any missing
alerts and predict the occurrence of future alerts.
Although connectivity contributes to the overall risk of a network, there are various
other metrics that come into play. Noel et al. [14] describe four main metrics, pertinent to
attack graphs, whose individual scores aggregate into a cumulative measure of risk: vic-
timization, size, containment, and topology. Each of these metrics have their own associ-
ated subcategories. The victimization metric pertains largely to the inherent vulnerabilities
present on a network. The size family reflects the overall size of the attack graph. Contain-
ment refers to the compartmentalization of network while topology refers to the interaction
and relationships between machines [14]. The aforementioned notion of connectivity hap-
pens to fall within the topology family of metrics [14].
The implementation of an advanced defensive measure may also assist in the reduction
of network risk. One such option known as moving target defense (MTD) causes a network
to periodically reconfigure itself [23]. The intent behind reconfiguration is to increase
an attacker’s reconnaissance periods [23]. An additional consequence of MTD is that an
attacker will frequently need to regain privileges that had been previously obtained [23].
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3.3 Rare-Event Simulation
Simulation is one means of evaluating statistics that describe the performance of stochastic
systems. However, assessing risk may be a computationally intensive feat should an event
of interest have a sufficiently rare likelihood. Output may be unobtainable or be of undesir-
able quality with wide confidence intervals. Therefore, special advanced techniques have
been developed to handle simulation involving rare events.
Two main rare-event simulation techniques have been used historically. The first of
the two is known as splitting and the second is known as Importance Sampling (IS). The
application of these Rare-Event Simulation (RES) techniques has had limited application
to cyber security [8]. Traditionally, more of the focus of cyber security analytics has been
allocated to the detection and prevention of cyber attacks, resulting in a lack of attention
being given to modeling associated impacts [8].
The splitting technique operates by creating copies of the simulation at various states.
The copies that reach a sufficient measure of “closeness” to the rare event are saved. The
simulation will then continue, utilizing these copies to improve the efficiency of the ex-
periment [19]. This Splitting approach has been employed to model rare events related to
worm infection. An earlier application dealt with the rare event of experiencing a packet
buffer overflow, given a threshold buffer size [8]. A later application, by contrast, evaluated
the rare event that a certain percentage of susceptible machines would become infected by
the worm. Said application utilized the susceptible-infectious-removed (SIR) model [10].
Susceptible machines can become infected, while infectious machines can infect other ma-
chines. Removed machines have the infection removed and cannot become reinfected [10].
Both applications yielded superior estimations of the rare event’s likelihood when com-
pared to the output of standard simulation [8, 10]. The overall concept of the splitting
technique can be seen in Figure 3.1.
The IS technique, in contrast to splitting, operates off the notion of enhancing certain
features of a network to cause rare events to occur more frequently. Output collected under
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Figure 3.1: Splitting Technique
amplified conditions are then translated back to the context of the original network to offer
usable statistics [18]. The process of network amplification in IS works by altering the
probability of obtaining a certain value for a predetermined random variable. Said alter-
ation is known as a change of measure [18]. The ratio of the original probability value to
the change of measure is the mechanism that allows for the aforementioned translation of
context. Performing a change of measure may not be straightforward as it may increase the
likelihood of one event of interest but not another [18]. Furthermore, sufficient probabilis-
tic amplification can cause the event of interest’s lack of occurrence to become rare. One
solution to this concern takes the form of the Cross-Entropy method (CE). Optimal changes
of measure can be ascertained from the implementation of the iterative CE process. The
notion of Kullback-Leibler divergence is a core feature to CE and is used to measure the
distance between two expected probability distributions. CE seeks to generate parameter
changes such that the Kullback-Leibler divergence is minimized [4].
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The CE method also has its own set of requirements. First and foremost, it must be pos-
sible to calculate the Kullback-Leibler divergence of a rare event’s probability distribution.
To this end, CE works best with the exponential family of distributions [4]. Additionally,
rare-events are defined with respect to some measure of interest exceeding some threshold.
Thus, CE makes heavy usage of continuous output data that can be sorted [4].
A preliminary, proof-of-concept, application of the IS methodology to model cyber at-
tacks was produced by Krall et al. [9]. The approach has an attacker move the network until
reaching one of two backup servers that contain data within a threshold number of attack
attempts. Note that the simulation would end once reaching one of the two goals. The path
taken is produced as a result of the attacker’s choices and successes/failures while launching
assaults on the network. Once a machine target was selected, the attacker would continue
to attack the machine until either successful or the attempt threshold was exceeded [9].
Additionally, the attacker was able to change source nodes when reaching a dead-end; a
dead-end is a machine whose outgoing connections only lead to other compromised ma-
chines. Once machines on the network were compromised, they remained accessible to
the attacker. Changes of measure were performed by amplifying the probability of suc-
cessfully compromising certain machines on the network. Ultimately the results of the
preliminary experimentation showed that higher quality estimates could be produced with
the same number of trials when using IS as opposed to standard simulation. Additionally,
IS required less computation effort to produce quality results [9].
3.4 Literature Analysis
Risk reduction through network reconfiguration requires ample knowledge surrounding
the current state of the network. Information derived from optimization models, sensors,
and other deterministic assessment tools can help give insight into which configuration
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alternatives may be worth pursuing [6,14,15,20]. Nonetheless, knowledge regarding post-
modification performance can inform a security specialist of the various trade-offs associ-
ated with each reconfiguration.
Use of CVSS scores can inform the development of a probabilistic representation of
a network topology [22], based on the services present on all machines. However, they
are most explicitly relevant to an attacker’s successes and failures when moving through
a network as opposed to the attacker’s selection of target. Ultimately, the likelihood that
any events of interest will occur must be held with respect to some temporal element;
if given enough time and effort, an attacker will be able to reach any goal. Impact is
statically defined in the assessed literature, although it is possible that impact scores could
be represented stochastically and follow a unique distribution. MITRE’s classification of
impact as the aggregate score of various categories extends the notion of impact beyond
mere immediate cost. When calculating risk from these aggregate impact scores, security
analysts are able to obtain an ordered list, which enables for a prioritized defensive focus.
Ultimately, the reliance of a measure of “closeness” for the splitting technique to func-
tion [8,10,19] makes its application highly unfavorable when dealing with scenarios where
an attacker moves through a network. When a network is deep and highly interconnected, it
becomes very unclear how “close” an attacker truly is to reaching a particular machine. By
contrast, IS, not relying on such a condition, makes it infinitely more favorable. Ideally, IS
would be used in conjunction with CE. However, CE’s requirements make it a very niche
methodology that cannot fit with cyber network movement. Therefore, without a means to
automate making changes of measure through CE, any amplification to an example network
for IS would need to be performed manually.
Krall et al.’s application of IS to cyber network movement has much room for improve-
ment. The attacker behavior can be updated to ascertain a more realistic notion of choice.
The attacker may choose a different target after a failure, for example. Additionally, ex-
tending the preliminary model to allow the attacker to continue moving after reaching a
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machine of interest enables for greater simulation efficiency: each run can potentially cap-




This section discusses the methodology by which an analytic risk assessment technique,
based on rare-event simulation, will be carried forth. The section opens by declaring the
scope of the investigation. After this, the design methodology, inclusive of the impor-
tance sampling methodology, is discussed. Once the design methodology is established,
the implementation of the design is identified. Following the implementation, the section
is concluded with a discussion on the experimental methods.
4.1 Scope of Work
The process developed by this thesis will produce a network risk vector with respect to all
predefined events of interest. These events will be limited to the infiltration of machines
of interest where an attacker must move through the network. Assessment of other types
of events of interest may not be compatible with the developed framework and, therefore,
would require the employment of different simulation techniques.
It is assumed that the attacker starts from a singular position, external to the network.
Machines are compromised by an attacker’s assault through the targeting of services on
user-specified machines. Importance sampling will be implemented as part of the frame-
work as a means to calculate the network risk vector with greater computational efficiency
and quality of output. To fulfill this intent, the overall probability density function corre-
sponding to events of interest must be tailored to handle advanced machine and machine
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service selection.
The primary objective of this thesis is to compare defensive and configuration alter-
natives for a given cyber network with the ultimate goal of reducing relative risk. Each
alternative’s risk vector must be compared against the original, unmodified network. The
percentage change in the individual elements of the risk vector can be used to gauge if
pursuing a network alternative is worth the associated cost and effort of implementation.
Connections between machines can be removed (or re-routed) or additional machines can
be added into the network as part of an analyst’s risk-reduction strategy.
4.2 Design Methods
The overall process will estimate a given network’s risk vector. Each element within the
risk vector corresponds to a data-theft event of interest. Thus the risk vector is given by
R = L× I. (4.1)
In this case, Ris the risk vector while L is the likelihood vector, held with respect to the
same time threshold, T . Lastly, I is the impact vector. Each entry for I is predetermined
and is therefore loaded into the simulation as a parameter for calculating risk. However,
it should be noted that the impact could follow a distribution that varies per simulation
run. Primarily, the simulation estimates values for each entry of L. The generalized IS
methodology will evaluate each entry of L by fulfilling the following steps:
1. Obtain probabilistic network parameters;
2. Assess candidates for amplification;
3. Perform the amplification;
4. Simulate using the amplified network; and
5. Scale the output into the context of the original network.
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Figure 4.1: IS Methodology Flowchart
4.3 Importance Sampling Methods
4.3.1 General Method
The generalized IS methodology, seen in Figure 4.1, starts with some metric of interest
Y with possible outcomes Y (x). Each outcome, x, occurs with probability f(x). Under
standard simulation, one can calculate the expected value of Y at density f , represented
by Ef (Y ) [18]. Equation (4.2) shows how to calculate the expected value for a metric of
interest under normal circumstances,
Ef (Y ) =
∫
Y (x)f(x)dx. (4.2)
Parameters of the network will then be assessed for amplification, whose modification
modifies density f . The changes of measure produce probability density g for metric Y .
Therefore, each outcome Y (x) would occur at probability g(x) when simulating under




is the same as multiplying by one:






Pulling away the term f
g
from Equation (4.3) gives us the condition by which one would




The ratio of density f to density g, given by W can then be utilized to translate the





This translation works by multiplying each outcome Y (x) by each W (x). Ultimately,
the translation works by using W to replace the impact of g with f in the final output
[18]. Scaling the output from the simulation under amplified conditions produces the same






g(x)dx = Ef (Y ). (4.6)
4.3.2 Security Framework
The generalized IS methodology is tailored to represent cases where an attacker moves
through a network. The following shows the different variables and sets that will be utilized
in calculating the likelihood of reaching a particular target machine.
SETS:
M : set of all machines.
Z: set of all target machines, Z ⊆M .
Mm: set of machines accessible from machine m, Mm ⊆M .
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M vm(j): set of vulnerable machines accessible from machine m during attempt j,
M vm(j) ⊆Mm.
Amn: set of services on machine n visible from machine m.
VARIABLES:
umn(j): probability of targeting machine n from machine m on attempt j.
vkmn: probability of targeting service k on machine n from machine m.
q(j): machine/service selection probability during attempt j.
p(j): success/failure probability during attempt j.
x =

1 If service k is compromised during attempt j.
0 Otherwise.
τz: compromising time of machine z.
fz(τz): probability that a attacker has reached machine z at compromising time τz.
gz(τz): probability under amplified conditions.
The attacker operates by leveraging assault attempts against services present on the
machines in the network. Within the total time horizon, T , there is a maximum of J
possible attempts that the attacker can execute. Note that each attempt consumes one unit of
time. During a particular replication, there are Ψ trials. Should a target, z, be compromised
during a particular trial ψ ∈ Ψ, the associated indicator variable will take a value of 1.
Otherwise, it will take a value of and 0, such that,
Izψ =

1 If target z is compromised during trial ψ within time horizon T
0 Otherwise.
(4.7)
When utilizing standard Monte Carlo simulation, the likelihood, Lz, that a particular
target z is compromised is given by the expected value of the indicator variable [4]. It is
represented as
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The calculations for the likelihood of reaching a target machine are held with respect
to each trial ψ. Said likelihood is dependent on the targeting, successes, and failures an
attacker experiences while moving through the network. Targeting always is done in two
phases when the attacker seeks to make an assault attempt. The first phase entails the se-
lection of a target machine. From a source, the attacker will look at all accessible machines
that are currently vulnerable. Each individual machine may have a unique selection prob-





∀ n ∈M vm(j). (4.9)
Once a machine has been selected, the attacker will select a vulnerable service on the
targeted machine. Each service is give a weight, which corresponds with an attacker’s inter-
ests and capabilities from a given source machine. The probability of selecting a particular





∀ k ∈ Amn,m ∈M,n ∈Mm (4.10)
The combined actions of selecting a machine and service represents the attacker’s
choice of targeting. Thus, the product of the two selection probabilities represents the
probability of a particular choice during an assault attempt, given by
q(j) = vkmnumn(j) ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. (4.11)
Once targeting has been determined, the attacker will being its assault attempt. During
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each attempt, the attacker will either have a success or failure. The probability that an at-
tacker succeeds or fails during an assault attempt is dependent on the probability of success
defined for a particular service,
p(j) = pxk(1− pk)1−x ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. (4.12)
If given a sufficiently long time period, an attacker would be able to reach every tar-
get. However, the simulation has an established time horizon, T . Therefore, there will
be cases where τz is unknown for a particular machine. The number of attempts required
to compromise a machine of interest is utilized in calculating the likelihood said machine
is compromised. As such, when τz is unavailable, T is used as a substitute, which corre-
sponds with J attempts. Thus, the number of attempts required to compromise a machine
of interest is shown by
Jz(τz) = min (Number of attempts needed to reach z at time τz, J). (4.13)
Formally, each assault path to a target has an associated probability. Each attempt
consists of a machine/service selection as well as a success/failure. The product of these
two elements gives each attempt an associated probability value. The combination of all
attempts forms the attacker’s assault path. Thus, the product of all attempt probabilities




p(j)q(j) ∀ z ∈ Z. (4.14)
When either elements of the success/failure or choice elements are amplified, the prob-
ability of generating a particular assault path becomes altered. When any consistent com-
ponent of p(j) or q(j) are amplified, then each become p′(j) and q′(j) respectively. The
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p′(j)q′(j) ∀ z ∈ Z. (4.15)




∀ z ∈ Z. (4.16)
Said ratio is employed when utilizing IS since the calculation of the likelihood is held
with respect to density g rather than density f . Scaling the simulation under amplified
conditions must make use of each Wz. Thus, a modified version of Equations (4.6) and
(4.8) produces the likelihood calculation for IS:






Tailoring the probability distribution associated with compromising a machine of inter-
est enables the application of IS. Simulation can be conducted under amplified conditions.
Once output data is received, said output can be scaled back into the context of the original
network by utilizing the ratio of the original probability density to the amplified probability
density. Thus, the likelihood a machine of interest is compromised can be determined.
4.4 Implementation Methods
The rare-event simulation techniques described in Section 4.2 are implemented with ap-
plication to a realistic and complex cyber network topology. The model receives several
inputs that are user-defined. Once these inputs are processed, several outputs will be re-
ceived. Figure 4.2 depicts how the IS methodology can be implemented. The required
inputs include the following:
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1. Number of trials and replications;
2. Network topology and services;
3. Impact and target data;
4. Default service selection weights;
5. Default service success probabilities;
6. Amplifications to weights and success probabilities; and
7. Attacker movement strategy.
Figure 4.2: Model Implementation Structure
Different types of machine movement strategies can be implemented into the attacker
behavior. Depth-based search is one such method that will be evaluated. As seen in Algo-
rithm 1, the number of attempts (j), attacker’s initial starting position, attacker knowledge,
target machines, success counter, and failure counter are initialized prior to movement. The
attacker knowledge describes all machines that have been compromised by the attacker so
far. Each of these machines will remain under the attacker’s control until the infiltration
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event terminates. If the number of attempts does not exceed the maximum number allowed
(J), the assault will continue. The attacker will then scan the outgoing connections attached
to its current source node. If all outgoing connections lead to compromised machines, the
attacker will attempt to change its source node such that at least one outgoing connection
leads to an un-compromised machine. If this is impossible, then the network infiltration
event ends. Once the attacker’s position is not a dead-end, then a target machine is chosen.
After a target machine is chosen, a service on the target machine is selected. Said service
is then attacked. The total number of assault attempts will increment by one regardless of
whether the attack is a success or failure. Should the attack be a success, the attacker’s
current position will be updated to be the targeted machine and the attacker knowledge will
be updated. At this time, the algorithm will check if the compromised machine is one of
the target machines. If it is a target, then the likelihood of reaching it will be calculated.
Should all target machines be compromised, infiltration will terminate and the replication
will end.
Breadth-based movement follows a similar methodology to depth-based movement and
is represented by Algorithm 2. The primary key difference is seen when the algorithm ini-
tializes. Breadth-based movement does not establish a source node. Instead, all currently
compromised machines in the attacker knowledge are treated as a collective source. Ev-
ery un-compromised machine stemming from the outgoing connections of this collective
source is a potential target for the attacker.
This distinction between machine selection strategies is displayed in Figures 4.3 and
4.4. Note that Figure 4.3 shows a source node that is used as a pivot point. Said source
is one of the currently compromised machines. Only outgoing, un-compromised machines
from this single pivot point are considered for potential targeting. By contrast, Figure
4.4 shows how all un-compromised machines connected to all compromised machines are
considered for targeting.
Impact data is also an input to the IS model. Table 4.1 is utilized as a heuristic to
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5: while j < J do
6: MachineOptions← availableConnections(SourceNode)
7: if isDeadEnd(MachineOptions) then










18: j ← j + 1
19: if isAttackSuccessful(AttackStatus) then
20: SourceNode← updateSourceNode(SelectedMachine)
21: Knowledge← Knowledge+ addKnowledge(SelectedMachine)
22: if isTarget(SelectedMachine, TargetMachines) then
23: recordLikelihood(SelectedMachine)







Algorithm 1: Depth-Based Movement
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1: j ← 1
2: Knowledge← addKnowledge(Internet)
3: TargetMachines← addTargets()
4: while j < J do
5: MachineOptions← [ ]






12: j ← j + 1
13: if isAttackSuccessful(AttackStatus) then
14: j ← j + 1
15: SuccessCounter ← SuccessCounter + 1
16: Knowledge← Knowledge+ addKnowledge(SelectedMachine)
17: if isTarget(SelectedMachine, TargetMachines) then
18: recordLikelihood(SelectedMachine)






Algorithm 2: Breadth-Based Movement
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Figure 4.3: Depth-Based Machine Selection Example
Figure 4.4: Breadth-Based Machine Selection Example
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assign an impact rating to each target machine should it become compromised. MITRE
has a generalized risk rating system whose categories are cost, technical performance, and
scheduling [12]. A similar impact-rating heuristic is formed whose categories are opera-
tional, financial, and schedule. These categories are rated from 1− 5 with 5 being the most
severe rating. The operational category describes the impact of the event on the ability
of the organization to perform core business functions, the financial category assesses the
direct implications on the budget, and the schedule category reflects any adjustments that
need to be made to project timelines.
Table 4.1: Impact Heuristic
Operational Financial Schedule
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Significant Ability to perform core







Moderate Ability to perform core















Minimal No impact on ability to
perform core business
function.
Budget is not affected. No
planning adjustments re-
quired.
Schedule is not affected.
No planning adjustments
required.
Although the probability of successfully exploiting a vulnerable service has been de-
fined, the method by which these probability values are determined has yet to be identified.
Each vulnerable service can be assigned a probability using CVSS version 3 [22]. The
methodology by which these values are assigned combine usage of Table 4.2 and Equation
(4.18).
For each CVSS category (AV, AC, PReq, and UI), the service is assigned a subcategory
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Table 4.2: CVSS Categorization Values




















based on its severity. FIRST classifies a methodology for assigning categories to vulner-
abilities [7]. When looking at AV, if the attacker exploits a vulnerable component via the
network stack, the categorization is either Network or Adjacent. Between these two, the
vulnerability can be exploited from a routed network, the categorization is Network. If
the attacker cannot exploit the vulnerability though the network stack, the categorization is
either Local or Physical. If the attack requires physical access to the target, the categoriza-
tion is Physical. The AC can either be Low or High. It is only High if the attacker cannot
exploit the vulnerability at will. PReq can either be None, Low, or High. If the attacker
does not need to be authorized, PReq is categorized as None. If administrator privileges are
required, PReq is High. UI is fairly straightforward. If the attacker requires another user to
perform an action, UI is Required. Otherwise, UI is None [7]. Each of these subcategories
corresponds to a range of scores, which are derived from Zhang et al. [22]. A uniform dis-
tribution is then used to give each service a single score for each subcategory for eventual
use in determining a probabilistic value. Equation (4.18) is then utilized to calculate the
final probability value for each service [22], given that there are K total services,
pk = 2.11× AVk × ACk × PReqk × UIk ∀ k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} (4.18)
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Consider CVE-2009-0658 as a potential vulnerability present on a service. According
to Zhang et al. [22], this vulnerability receives Local for AV, Low for AC, None for PReq,
and Required for UI. Table 4.3 shows a potential probability scoring for this particular
vulnerability.







Each service also takes a selection weight as an input for the IS model. The method by
which these weight inputs are seen is shown in Table 4.4. These weights are assigned to
each service according to the attacker’s interest. Said interest is controlled by an attacker’s
capabilities and intent. Interest is placed into four categories: low, medium, high, and very
high. Each category is given a high and low value which feeds into a uniform distribution
when assigning weights to services. The potential value of the weights exponentially in-
creases as the interest level increases. Said exponential scaling ensures that a service of
very high interest is much more likely to be selected by an attacker than a service of low
interest.
Table 4.4: Interest Rating
Interest Lower Bound Upper Bound




The final input of the IS model concerns the network topology and services. An input
topology must include information regarding which machines are present on the network
and how said machines are connected to each other. Additionally, the services present
on the network must be assigned to the network’s various machines. Some services on a
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machine may or may not be visible from a particular source machine when the attacker
leverages assaults; this type of access information must be specified as an input. Nonethe-
less, once all input information has been received, the IS model can be utilized.
4.5 Experimental Methods
Comparison of the proposed IS methodology can be assessed from two distinct perspec-
tives. The first perspective seeks to contrast the quality of risk estimates between methods.
A (1 − α) confidence interval can be produced for a static number of runs per replication,
where α is the probability of Type I error. The risk estimates of each test case should
be roughly the same. However, the bounds of the confidence interval should be different.
Confidence intervals with a smaller halfwidth indicate a more accurate risk estimation.
The second perspective seeks to compare the computation effort required by each tech-
nique to ascertain a quality estimate of the network’s risk. First, some measure of a quality
estimator must be established. In the case of this thesis, a quality estimate of risk is given by
a confidence interval that falls within some percentage of the mean. Thus, additional trials
will be run until each confidence interval converges appropriately. Note that convergence
necessitates checking each confidence interval at certain points within the simulation to
make sure it falls within the aforementioned criteria. Expedient convergence indicates less
expenditure of computation effort. Therefore, the number of trials required for convergence
is utilized as a measure of time. Pure computational time is not utilized as a meaningful
metric since different computers have varying hardware, which can obfuscate the utility of
the IS technique.
To increase the efficiency of the simulation, convergence will only be checked at cal-
culated milestones, represented by a specified number of trials for a particular replication.
The first milestone must be established prior to running the simulation. Should conver-
gence not be reached at a milestone, the number of trials needed to recheck convergence
will be calculated based off current statistics.
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CONVERGENCE:
Λz: set of likelihoods of compromising target z
L̄z: average likelihood of compromising z




θ: likelihood quality threshold (%)
ψcz: number of trials needed before re-checking convergence for machine z.
The confidence interval for the likelihood must converge to be within some θ% of the
mean. Therefore, one can determine the number of trials needed to obtain a quality esti-
mate. For each machine of interest:





























Ultimately, the true number of trials needed before checking convergence will be the
maximum of all ψcz since the likelihood confidence interval needs to converge for all ma-
chines of interest.
When running experiments from both perspectives, it is possible to give additional value
to each trial. An entire set of replications could be run to assess the risk of a single event of
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interest. However, there may be multiple events of interest on a single network; assessing
each event independently would necessitate more total runs. Instead, the attacker can be
allowed to continue moving through the network, even after reaching a single machine of
interest. Thus, statistics can be collected about all events of interest simultaneously during




This section discusses the experimentation performed using the IS model. A network ex-
ample is first established, which will be fed into the model as an input. Next, the remaining
experimentation-specific inputs will be identified. Afterwards, the results obtained by the
IS model are shown and discussed.
5.1 Network Example
One of the primary inputs to the IS model is a network topology and services. Thus,
for the purposes of experimentation, such an example network must be defined. For the
purposes of this investigation, the network presented in Figure 5.1 will be utilized as a base
case. This example network is derived from the Collegiate Penetration Testing Competition
held in 2016 [3]. The main network is composed of four sub networks, which have some
connectivity between each other.
The example represents the network infrastructure of a hypothetical healthcare-oriented
facility. All connections between machines are networked, but only some servers are
public-facing. Subnet 1 contains workstations and other machines common in a doctor’s
office. 4482 primarily deals with electronic medical records (EMR). By contrast, 4483 is
billing-oriented. 33223 deals with information technology related issues. DC01 is the do-
main controller which serves as an authentication barrier when seeking access to the file
share, located on FILES. Additionally, PRINT is a network printer that is shared between
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Figure 5.1: Network Example - Base Case
workstations. XRAY-13 is a machine capable of producing x-ray images.
Subnet 2 houses the EMR functionality of the facility. WEB02 is the actual EMR
application server, with its information being stored on the DB02 database. Subnet 3 hosts
a variety of functions. WEB01 is a billing application server, with information stored on
the DB01 database. The OPS & WIKI server hosts the IT Wiki. PR runs a public relations
Twitter bot that publishes protein folding research.
Subnet 4’s primary functionality is the development of the aforementioned protein fold-
ing research. FOLDING represents an application server for the research, with information
stored on STORAGE. CI is a continuous integration server and works in conjunction with
the GIT repository server for code development. TS01 is a terminal services application
server that enables the IT workstation to remote into the other workstations on the net-
work. The BASTION server acts as a barrier between the public Internet and the rest of the
subnet.
Each service on the network must be given assignments compliant with CVSS version
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3 to determine the success probabilities. Table 5.1 displays each service that is present
on network alongside their machine locations and CVSS categorization assignments. The
assignments for user interaction and privileges required are not shown in the table. Each
service receives a “None” for user interaction and “High” for privileges required. Table 5.1
also shows the interest categorizations utilized for assigning services selection weights.
One of the final required inputs relevant to the network topology concerns the impact
data. For the purposes of this experiment, the attacker seeks to exfiltrate data stores on the
four database servers: FILES, DB01, DB02, and STORAGE. Impact ratings are assigned
to each database in Table 5.2. The aggregate score of all three categories represents the
impact should the machine become compromised.
Various network reconfigurations are assessed in addition to the base case. The first
reconfiguration alternative can be seen in Figure 5.2. The connection between the public
relations server and protein folding application server is modified to be unidirectional. Data
can now only be sent from FOLDING to PR. This case is known as “Modify Connection.”
The second case is shown in Figure 5.3 and is known as “Move Connection.” The con-
nection from 33223 to BASTION has been moved to exist between 33223 and TS01. the
third case sees the additional of new machine functionality to the network. An additional
BASTION server, shown as BASTION2, is added to Subnet 4, as seen in Figure 5.4. This
experimental case is referred to as “New Machine.” Since the data contained on STORAGE
is significantly important to the organization, an additional layer of authentication security
may be desirable. The last alternative modifies the BASTION server to be private-facing,
shown in Figure 5.5, and is labeled as “Public to Private.”
Given these input parameters, the only remaining inputs are the number of trials and
replications as well as the degrees of amplification utilized for experimentation. Attacker
movement will be limited to depth and breadth-based behaviors.
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Table 5.1: Service CVSS Categorization
Services Locations Interest AccessComplexity
Access
Vector




Very High Low Adjacent
EMR Web Application WEB02 High High Adjacent
FreeBSD 9.1 BASTION Moderate High Network
GitLab GIT Moderate Low Adjacent
Internal IT Wiki OPS & WIKI Low High Adjacent




Very High High Adjacent
NodeJS Web Application PR Low High Adjacent
Non-HIPPAA/PCI Compliant
Billing Application
WEB01 High High Network
Picture Archive and
Communication System
XRAY-13 High High Network
PostgreSQL DB01 Very High High Adjacent
Print Application PRINT Low Low Adjacent
Protein Folding Application FOLDING High High Adjacent
Remote Desktop TS01 Moderate High Adjacent
SSH BASTION High High Network
Telnet STORAGE Low Low Adjacent
Terminal Services TS01 Moderate High Adjacent











Windows 7 4482, 4483 High Low Network
Windows 8 33223 High Low Network
Windows Server 2003 XRAY-13 Moderate Low Network
Windows Server 2008 R2-1 DC01 Moderate High Adjacent
Windows Server 2008 R2-2 FILES Moderate High Network
Windows Server 2012 TS01 Moderate High Network
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Figure 5.2: Network Example - Modify Connection
Figure 5.3: Network Example - Move Connection
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Figure 5.4: Network Example - New Machine
Figure 5.5: Network Example - Public to Private
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Table 5.2: Impact Assignments
Impact Score
Machine Operational Financial Schedule
FILES 2 1 3
DB01 4 3 2
DB02 4 4 3
STORAGE 4 5 5
5.2 Experimental Setup
At this time, the specific settings given to the simulation will be identified. Each experi-
mental case will be run with 30 total replications. When testing computational efficiency,
the maximum number of possible trials will be 1 × 108 for both depth and breadth-based
network movement. When testing for the quality of estimate, depth-based movement will
be run at a static 50, 000 trials. Likewise, breadth-based movement will be run with a static
4 × 106 trials when determining the quality of the estimate; this number is different be-
cause breadth-based cases require significantly more trials to produce quality estimates. In
all experimental cases, α = 0.05 and the maximum number of assault attempts the attacker
can levy is J = 10, which allows for multiple machines of interest to be compromised
during a single infiltration event. Different levels of amplification will be tested for differ-
ent experimental cases. Amplification will be carried forth by multiplying all probabilities
of successfully compromising a service on a machine by a given factor. Note that an am-
plification of one corresponds to no network amplification; these cases represent usage of
standard simulation as opposed to IS. In total, amplification levels of 1x, 1.25x, 1.5x, 1.75x
and 2x will be tested. Amplification above 2x runs the risk of assigning probability values
greater than one.
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5.3 Base Case Results
5.3.1 Computational Savings - Depth
There is an exponential decrease in the number of trials required to convergence on a quality
likelihood estimation when attackers adhere to depth-based movement. This trend can be
seen in Figure 5.6, which shows that when the degree of amplification shifts from 1x to 2x,
there is about an 83.5% reduction in the computational effort.
Figure 5.6: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - Computational Savings
As seen in Figures 5.7 - 5.10, the confidence interval of the likelihood estimates for
compromising all database servers of interest falls within the predetermined ±10% of the
mean. The confidence interval for STORAGE remains constant across all degrees of am-
plification. However, for FILES, DB01, and DB02, the confidence interval widens as the
degree of amplification increases. The DB01 and DB02 confidence intervals widen to
nearly touch the ±10% limits when approaching 2x amplification.
The variance of the likelihood estimates is shown in Figures 5.11 - 5.14. The variance
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Figure 5.7: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - FILES Likelihood
Figure 5.8: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - DB01 Likelihood
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Figure 5.9: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - DB02 Likelihood
Figure 5.10: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - STORAGE Likelihood
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follows a parabolic curve for FILES, DB01, and DB02. For each of these events, the
variance hits a low point at around 1.5x amplification. By contrast, the variance follows an
exponential decrease for STORAGE.
5.3.2 Computational Savings - Breadth
Amplification has a similar effect on computational savings when attackers utilize breadth-
based as opposed to depth-based movement, as seen in Figure 5.15. As the degree of am-
plification increases, the number of trials required to produce a quality likelihood estimate
exponentially decreases. Shifting the degree of amplification from 1x to 2x decreases the
number of trials by about 79.8%. However, it should be noted that breadth-based movement
required a significantly larger number of trials than depth-based movement.
As seen in Figures 5.16 - 5.19, the confidence interval of the likelihood estimates for
compromising all database servers of interest falls within the predetermined ±10% of the
mean. The confidence intervals for FILES, DB01, and DB02 widen as the degree of ampli-
fication increases. However, unlike in Figures 5.7 - 5.10, these confidence intervals are very
far away from the ±10% limits. The confidence interval for STORAGE remains relatively
constant across all degrees of amplification although there appears to be a slight sinusoidal
pattern.
The variance of the likelihood estimates for breadth-based movement when running the
convergence method follow similar trends as those seen in Figures 5.11 - 5.14 for depth-
based movement. These figures are shown in Appendix A
5.3.3 Estimate Quality - Depth
Figures 5.20 - 5.23 shows the likelihood confidence intervals for depth-based movement
when running a static number of trials. The confidence interval for STORAGE becomes
tighter as the degree of amplification increase. By contrast, the confidence intervals for
FILES, DB01, and DB02 decrease as the degree of amplification approaches 1.5x. After
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Figure 5.11: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - FILES Variance
Figure 5.12: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - DB01 Variance
44
Figure 5.13: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - DB02 Variance
Figure 5.14: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - STORAGE Variance
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Figure 5.15: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - Computational Savings
exceeding this threshold, the confidence intervals start increasing in size.
The variance patterns seen when running a static number of trials for depth-based move-
ment are similar to those seen when running the convergence method. These figures are
shown in Appendix A
5.3.4 Estimate Quality - Breadth
Figures 5.24 - 5.27 shows the likelihood confidence intervals for breadth-based movement
when running a static number of trials. Like with depth-based movement, the confidence
interval for STORAGE becomes tighter as the degree of amplification increase. By con-
trast, the confidence intervals for FILES, DB01, and DB02 decrease as the degree of am-
plification approaches 1.5x. After exceeding this threshold, the confidence intervals start
increasing in size.
The variance patterns seen when running a static number of trials for breadth-based
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Figure 5.16: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - FILES Likelihood
Figure 5.17: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - DB01 Likelihood
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Figure 5.18: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - DB02 Likelihood
Figure 5.19: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - STORAGE Likelihood
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Figure 5.20: Static - Depth - Base Case - FILES Likelihood
Figure 5.21: Static - Depth - Base Case - DB01 Likelihood
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Figure 5.22: Static - Depth - Base Case - DB02 Likelihood
Figure 5.23: Static - Depth - Base Case - STORAGE Likelihood
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Figure 5.24: Static - Breadth - Base Case - FILES Likelihood
Figure 5.25: Static - Breadth - Base Case - DB01 Likelihood
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Figure 5.26: Static - Breadth - Base Case - DB02 Likelihood
Figure 5.27: Static - Breadth - Base Case - STORAGE Likelihood
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movement are similar to those seen when running the convergence method. These figures
are shown in Appendix A
5.4 Reconfiguration Results
Different reconfiguration alternatives are explored and compared against the base case.
Each case is assessed to determine the computational savings and quality of estimates of
IS. The results for computational savings follow the patterns seen for the base case. Figures
are not shown in this section although the data can be found in the Appendix C.
The comparison between configuration alternatives for depth-based movement can be
seen in Figures 5.28 - 5.31. Comparison between alternatives is derived from data obtained
running a static number of trials. An amplification level of 1.75x was selected for com-
parison purposes. The likelihood of compromising DB02 remained relatively constant for
all configuration alternatives, although the case for Public to Private shows a value that is
slightly higher. A similar trend can be seen for FILES, except that the Public to Private
likelihood value is significantly higher than those for the other configurations. DB01 mir-
rors the trends seen for DB02 except for the Modify Connection case, which showed a
slightly higher likelihood. The configuration alternatives had the most profound impact on
the likelihood of compromising STORAGE. Within the scope of STORAGE, the Modify
Connection, New Machine, and Public to Private alternatives all displayed a significant re-
duction in likelihood from the Base Case. Overall, the values for the New Machine and
Public to Private cases did not significantly differ from each other. The Modify Connection
alternative caused the largest decrease in likelihood among all alternatives. By contrast, the
Move Connection case did not significantly differ from the Base Case.
When assessing the configuration alternatives with respect to breadth-based movement,
it can be seen in Figures 5.32 - 5.35 that only the Public to Private case differed signifi-
cantly from the Base Case for FILES, DB01, and DB02. The Public to Private case caused
the likelihood of compromising these servers to increase dramatically. For STORAGE, the
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Figure 5.28: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Depth - STORAGE
Figure 5.29: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Depth - DB01
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Figure 5.30: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Depth - DB02
Figure 5.31: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Depth - FILES
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Move Connection case was the only configuration alternative that did not differ signifi-
cantly from the Base Case. Modify Connection, New Machine, and Public to Private all
decrease the likelihood of compromising STORAGE, with the New Machine alternative
causing the greatest reduction.
5.5 Discussion
Recall that all events of interest are assessed simultaneously during a single experimental
case. The attacker is allowed to continue moving through the network, even after reaching
a single machine of interest. This methodology has implications that are reflected when
viewing the confidence intervals for the convergence cases. The event that STORAGE
is compromised is the rarest of all events of interest. For both depth and breadth-based
movement, STORAGE’s confidence interval has a halfwidth that remains constant across
all degrees of amplification, which can be seen in Figure 5.10 and 5.19. Thus, STORAGE
appears to be the limiting factor when running convergence; the number of required trials
depends on STORAGE. In contrast to STORAGE, the confidence intervals for the FILES,
DB01, and DB02 likelihoods widen as the degree of amplification increases. Nonetheless,
these confidence intervals still fall within the pre-specified bounds of quality. The expla-
nation for this behavior may be two-fold. The primary contribution to this result may be
the fact that the number of trials decreases as the degree of amplification increases due to
convergence limitations imposed by STORAGE. A secondary contribution to the widen-
ing of the confidence intervals would be the increase in variance for amplification greater
than 1.5x. The size of the confidence interval halfwidth grows as the number of trials de-







When running a static number of trials to determine the quality of the estimate across
differing degrees of amplification, it can be seen that the size of the confidence intervals are
correlated with the variance. The correlation is most profound when looking at the results
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Figure 5.32: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Breadth - STORAGE
Figure 5.33: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Breadth - DB01
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Figure 5.34: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Breadth - DB02
Figure 5.35: Configuration Likelihood Comparison - Breadth - FILES
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for STORAGE in both the depth and breadth-based cases.
When comparing configuration alternatives, various trade-offs can be seen. In all cases,
the Move Connection case did not provide a meaningful change in the likelihood of the
events of interest. Therefore, a network analyst would avoid this alternative. For depth-
based movement the Modify Connection case resulted in the largest decrease in the like-
lihood of compromising STORAGE. However, compromising DB01 became more likely.
Due to the nature of the attacker logic, making the connection between PR and FOLDING
unidirectional towards PR would mean that the attacker would treat PR as a dead-end and
begin its back-tracking routine. The closest database server to PR is DB01. A similar phe-
nomenon can be seen in the Public to Private case when utilizing breadth-based movement.
Making the BASTION server private means that Subnet 4 is not immediately visible to the
attacker, meaning STORAGE is deeper within the network than the other database severs.
Essentially, keeping BASTION publicly-facing seems to draw attacks away from the other
servers.
Simply shutting off an option for an attacker seems to have unintended consequences.
However, the Add Machine case may provide insight into this dilemma. The addition of the
second BASTION server beneath the first BASTION server seems to act as a trap. Keep-
ing the first BASTION server draws in the attacker since it is publicly-facing and, thus,
pulls attacks away from the other databases. The second BASTION server then acts as a
secondary barrier that makes obtaining a path to STORAGE more difficult. The results
show that this alternative provides equal, if not better, reductions in the likelihood of com-
promising STORAGE. Overall, the Add Machine option represents the best configuration
alternative due to the lack of unintended negative consequences.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the relative risk reduction when moving from the Base Case
to the selected New Machine alternative. For both depth and breadth-based movement,
STORAGE’s risk significantly decreases. However, it should be noted that there is a slight
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increase in the risk of DB02 and FILES for both movement cases. For depth-based move-
ment, the risk of DB01 slightly decreases, whereas it slightly increases for breadth-based
movement.
Table 5.3: Depth - Risk Reduction
Base Case New Machine
Machine Impact Likelihood Risk Likelihood Risk % Change
FILES 6 2.06E-01 1.24E+00 2.07E-01 1.24E+00 0.22%
DB01 9 6.49E-02 5.84E-01 6.46E-02 5.82E-01 -0.40%
DB02 11 3.24E-02 3.57E-01 3.26E-02 3.59E-01 0.48%
STORAGE 14 4.63E-03 6.49E-02 3.34E-03 4.68E-02 -27.80%
Table 5.4: Breadth - Risk Reduction
Base Case New Machine
Machine Impact Likelihood Risk Likelihood Risk % Change
FILES 6 3.60E-02 2.16E-01 3.65E-02 2.19E-01 1.33%
DB01 9 2.32E-02 2.09E-01 2.35E-02 2.12E-01 1.39%
DB02 11 1.23E-02 1.36E-01 1.25E-02 1.37E-01 1.13%
STORAGE 14 3.16E-05 4.43E-04 1.20E-05 1.69E-04 -61.92%
Figures 5.28 - 5.35 shows the comparison between configuration alternatives when uti-
lizing IS with a degree of amplification of 1.75x; these comparisons use a static number of
trials. Utilizing standard simulation to generate this comparison results in estimates with
wider confidence intervals. To produce estimates of similar quality as IS, more trials must
be run. Since all events are assessed together, STORAGE becomes the limiting factor. This
means that trials must be run until the confidence interval of STORAGE sufficiently nar-
rows. The number of additional trials required for each experimental case can be seen in
Figures 5.36 and 5.37 for depth and bread-based movement, respectively.
For comparison purposes, all reconfiguration cases must be run with the same number
of trials for each attacker movement strategy. Therefore, the maximum number of addi-
tional trials required among all cases is utilized. Figures 5.38 - 5.41 show the difference in
confidence intervals when running standard simulation for depth-based parsing.
Likewise, Figures 5.42 - 5.45 show the difference in confidence intervals when running
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Figure 5.36: Additional Trials Required - Depth
Figure 5.37: Additional Trials Required - Breadth
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Figure 5.38: Standard Simulation - Depth - Comparison - STORAGE
Figure 5.39: Standard Simulation - Depth - Comparison - DB01
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Figure 5.40: Standard Simulation - Depth - Comparison - DB02
Figure 5.41: Standard Simulation - Depth - Comparison - FILES
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standard simulation for breadth-based parsing. Zoomed in versions for some of the figures
can be seen in Appendix B.
When running additional trials for standard simulation, the confidence intervals for the
likelihood estimate narrow. IS can produce these better confidence intervals without need-
ing to run additional trials.
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Figure 5.42: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - STORAGE
Figure 5.43: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB01
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Figure 5.44: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB02
Figure 5.45: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - FILES
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Chapter 6
Conclusions & Future Work
Assessing the risk of various types of cyber attacks is a core interest to a security analyst.
This thesis has applied a tailored IS methodology in order to compare network configu-
ration alternatives against each other with an analytic framework. In particular, the risk
of data theft was determined on a healthcare-oriented network. The IS methodology was
able to deliver higher quality estimates with greater computational efficiency than could be
derived from standard simulation.
6.1 Future Work
The IS methodology was tested with respect to a single network example and its various
reconfigurations. To be robust, testing with additional networks with diverse configuration
alternatives should be conducted. Additionally, the impact scoring system could be given
its own probability distribution, dependent on the attacker’s actions while moving through
the network. The attacker logic can also be upgraded to be a hybrid between the depth and
breadth-based movement methodologies. Such testing will enable for additional trends to
be established between the likelihood variances and degree of amplification. Said relation-
ship could be used in a small pilot study to determine optimal degrees of amplification as to
acquire the highest quality estimates for all events of interest when running the main study.
Additionally, the simulation can be tailored to store the scenarios that result in an at-
tacker reaching a machine of interest on the network, should such an event be sufficiently
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rare. Since only a few scenarios will cause the event to occur, tracking these scenarios
can provide further insight into choosing configuration alternatives to test. The more in-
formation available to the analyst, the more informed their decisions will be. Nonetheless,
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Figure A.1: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - FILES Variance
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Figure A.2: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - DB01 Variance
Figure A.3: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - DB02 Variance
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Figure A.4: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - STORAGE Variance
Figure A.5: Static - Depth - Base Case - FILES Variance
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Figure A.6: Static - Depth - Base Case - DB01 Variance
Figure A.7: Static - Depth - Base Case - DB02 Variance
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Figure A.8: Static - Depth - Base Case - STORAGE Variance
Figure A.9: Static - Breadth - Base Case - FILES Variance
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Figure A.10: Static - Breadth - Base Case - DB01 Variance
Figure A.11: Static - Breadth - Base Case - DB02 Variance
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Figure A.12: Static - Breadth - Base Case - STORAGE Variance
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Appendix B
Standard Simulation Comparison Charts
Figure B.1: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB01
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Figure B.2: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB01
Figure B.3: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB02
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Figure B.4: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - DB02
Figure B.5: Standard Simulation - Breadth - Comparison - FILES
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Table C.1: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - Number of Trials






Table C.2: Convergence - Depth - Base Case - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.04E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.20E-01
1.50 2.06E-01 2.10E-01 2.02E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.06E-01 2.11E-01 2.01E-01 1.36E-01
2.00 2.05E-01 2.12E-01 1.98E-01 2.09E-01
DB01
1.00 6.49E-02 6.65E-02 6.34E-02 6.07E-02
1.25 6.47E-02 6.67E-02 6.27E-02 4.71E-02
1.50 6.49E-02 6.74E-02 6.24E-02 4.50E-02
1.75 6.53E-02 6.85E-02 6.21E-02 5.30E-02
2.00 6.48E-02 6.90E-02 6.05E-02 7.73E-02
DB02
1.00 3.23E-02 3.34E-02 3.12E-02 3.12E-02
1.25 3.25E-02 3.39E-02 3.11E-02 2.31E-02
1.50 3.25E-02 3.42E-02 3.08E-02 2.10E-02
1.75 3.23E-02 3.44E-02 3.02E-02 2.27E-02
2.00 3.31E-02 3.58E-02 3.03E-02 3.39E-02
STORAGE
1.00 4.65E-03 5.08E-03 4.22E-03 4.63E-03
1.25 4.65E-03 5.08E-03 4.22E-03 2.29E-03
1.50 4.63E-03 5.07E-03 4.19E-03 1.39E-03
1.75 4.63E-03 5.08E-03 4.19E-03 1.00E-03
2.00 4.66E-03 5.10E-03 4.22E-03 8.30E-04
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Table C.3: Convergence - Depth - Modify Connection - Number of Trials






Table C.4: Convergence - Depth - Modify Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.06E-01 2.08E-01 2.04E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.06E-01 2.08E-01 2.05E-01 1.21E-01
1.50 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.04E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.37E-01
2.00 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.03E-01 2.10E-01
DB01
1.00 7.45E-02 7.55E-02 7.35E-02 6.89E-02
1.25 7.44E-02 7.56E-02 7.32E-02 5.20E-02
1.50 7.45E-02 7.59E-02 7.31E-02 4.83E-02
1.75 7.46E-02 7.65E-02 7.27E-02 5.48E-02
2.00 7.45E-02 7.71E-02 7.20E-02 7.85E-02
DB02
1.00 3.24E-02 3.31E-02 3.17E-02 3.14E-02
1.25 3.24E-02 3.32E-02 3.17E-02 2.30E-02
1.50 3.25E-02 3.34E-02 3.15E-02 2.09E-02
1.75 3.25E-02 3.38E-02 3.13E-02 2.32E-02
2.00 3.26E-02 3.43E-02 3.10E-02 3.23E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.60E-03 1.75E-03 1.45E-03 1.60E-03
1.25 1.60E-03 1.74E-03 1.46E-03 7.80E-04
1.50 1.62E-03 1.77E-03 1.48E-03 4.81E-04
1.75 1.62E-03 1.77E-03 1.47E-03 3.41E-04
2.00 1.61E-03 1.76E-03 1.45E-03 2.84E-04
Table C.5: Convergence - Depth - Move Connection - Number of Trials







Table C.6: Convergence - Depth - Move Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.08E-01 2.10E-01 2.05E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.04E-01 1.21E-01
1.50 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.03E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.08E-01 2.13E-01 2.03E-01 1.37E-01
2.00 2.07E-01 2.14E-01 2.01E-01 2.06E-01
DB01
1.00 6.51E-02 6.66E-02 6.36E-02 6.08E-02
1.25 6.51E-02 6.70E-02 6.31E-02 4.73E-02
1.50 6.50E-02 6.75E-02 6.25E-02 4.47E-02
1.75 6.46E-02 6.77E-02 6.16E-02 5.10E-02
2.00 6.43E-02 6.85E-02 6.02E-02 7.80E-02
DB02
1.00 3.31E-02 3.64E-02 2.98E-02 3.20E-02
1.25 3.31E-02 3.44E-02 3.17E-02 2.33E-02
1.50 3.34E-02 3.52E-02 3.17E-02 2.14E-02
1.75 3.34E-02 3.55E-02 3.13E-02 2.35E-02
2.00 3.33E-02 3.59E-02 3.06E-02 3.23E-02
STORAGE
1.00 4.54E-03 4.95E-03 4.13E-03 4.52E-03
1.25 4.51E-03 4.93E-03 4.08E-03 2.24E-03
1.50 4.50E-03 4.93E-03 4.06E-03 1.36E-03
1.75 4.40E-03 4.83E-03 3.98E-03 9.59E-04
2.00 4.48E-03 4.91E-03 4.06E-03 8.05E-04
Table C.7: Convergence - Depth - New Machine - Number of Trials







Table C.8: Convergence - Depth - New Machine - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.07E-01 2.09E-01 2.05E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.07E-01 2.09E-01 2.04E-01 1.20E-01
1.50 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.02E-01 1.38E-01
2.00 2.06E-01 2.12E-01 2.00E-01 2.07E-01
DB01
1.00 6.49E-02 6.61E-02 6.36E-02 6.06E-02
1.25 6.47E-02 6.63E-02 6.32E-02 4.71E-02
1.50 6.47E-02 6.68E-02 6.27E-02 4.48E-02
1.75 6.46E-02 6.74E-02 6.19E-02 5.20E-02
2.00 6.46E-02 6.83E-02 6.09E-02 7.72E-02
DB02
1.00 3.26E-02 3.35E-02 3.18E-02 3.16E-02
1.25 3.28E-02 3.38E-02 3.17E-02 2.31E-02
1.50 3.27E-02 3.41E-02 3.13E-02 2.10E-02
1.75 3.27E-02 3.45E-02 3.08E-02 2.33E-02
2.00 3.28E-02 3.52E-02 3.04E-02 3.29E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.27E-03 3.55E-03 2.99E-03 3.26E-03
1.25 3.33E-03 3.61E-03 3.04E-03 1.62E-03
1.50 3.30E-03 3.60E-03 3.00E-03 9.76E-04
1.75 3.30E-03 3.62E-03 2.99E-03 6.99E-04
2.00 3.33E-03 3.65E-03 3.01E-03 5.92E-04
Table C.9: Convergence - Depth - Public to Private - Number of Trials







Table C.10: Convergence - Depth - Public to Private - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.30E-01 2.32E-01 2.27E-01 1.77E-01
1.25 2.30E-01 2.33E-01 2.27E-01 1.30E-01
1.50 2.30E-01 2.34E-01 2.27E-01 1.25E-01
1.75 2.29E-01 2.34E-01 2.24E-01 1.55E-01
2.00 2.30E-01 2.37E-01 2.23E-01 2.41E-01
DB01
1.00 7.28E-02 7.42E-02 7.14E-02 6.75E-02
1.25 7.26E-02 7.44E-02 7.08E-02 5.25E-02
1.50 7.23E-02 7.47E-02 7.00E-02 5.02E-02
1.75 7.32E-02 7.62E-02 7.02E-02 5.98E-02
2.00 7.22E-02 7.62E-02 6.83E-02 8.93E-02
DB02
1.00 3.60E-02 3.70E-02 3.50E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.59E-02 3.72E-02 3.47E-02 2.55E-02
1.50 3.61E-02 3.77E-02 3.45E-02 2.35E-02
1.75 3.62E-02 3.82E-02 3.42E-02 2.66E-02
2.00 3.61E-02 3.86E-02 3.36E-02 3.60E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.60E-03 3.93E-03 3.28E-03 3.59E-03
1.25 3.56E-03 3.89E-03 3.22E-03 1.75E-03
1.50 3.66E-03 4.01E-03 3.31E-03 1.11E-03
1.75 3.56E-03 3.90E-03 3.22E-03 7.66E-04
2.00 3.63E-03 3.97E-03 3.28E-03 6.71E-04
Table C.11: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - Number of Trials







Table C.12: Convergence - Breadth - Base Case - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.59E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.59E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 2.72E-02
2.00 3.60E-02 3.63E-02 3.58E-02 4.09E-02
DB01
1.00 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 2.27E-02
1.25 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.66E-02
1.50 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.30E-02 1.84E-02
2.00 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.30E-02 2.83E-02
DB02
1.00 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.90E-03
1.50 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.28E-03
1.75 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 9.65E-03
2.00 1.24E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.45E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.14E-05 3.42E-05 2.85E-05 3.14E-05
1.25 3.18E-05 3.48E-05 2.89E-05 1.50E-05
1.50 3.13E-05 3.41E-05 2.85E-05 9.31E-06
1.75 3.20E-05 3.50E-05 2.90E-05 7.59E-06
2.00 3.14E-05 3.45E-05 2.84E-05 7.29E-06
Table C.13: Convergence - Breadth - Modify Connection - Number of Trials







Table C.14: Convergence - Breadth - Modify Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.59E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.59E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.59E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.61E-02 3.62E-02 3.59E-02 2.72E-02
2.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 4.10E-02
DB01
1.00 2.33E-02 2.33E-02 2.32E-02 2.27E-02
1.25 2.33E-02 2.33E-02 2.32E-02 1.67E-02
1.50 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.32E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.85E-02
2.00 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 2.82E-02
DB02
1.00 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.90E-03
1.50 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.30E-03
1.75 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 9.60E-03
2.00 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 1.45E-02
STORAGE
1.00 2.01E-05 2.19E-05 1.82E-05 2.01E-05
1.25 1.98E-05 2.16E-05 1.79E-05 9.26E-06
1.50 2.01E-05 2.19E-05 1.82E-05 5.88E-06
1.75 1.99E-05 2.18E-05 1.80E-05 4.59E-06
2.00 1.97E-05 2.16E-05 1.77E-05 4.40E-06
Table C.15: Convergence - Breadth - Move Connection - Number of Trials







Table C.16: Convergence - Breadth - Move Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.60E-02 3.59E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.59E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.71E-02
2.00 3.59E-02 3.62E-02 3.57E-02 4.06E-02
DB01
1.00 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 2.27E-02
1.25 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.66E-02
1.50 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.85E-02
2.00 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.30E-02 2.83E-02
DB02
1.00 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.89E-03
1.50 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.29E-03
1.75 1.24E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 9.64E-03
2.00 1.24E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.46E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.04E-05 3.30E-05 2.77E-05 3.04E-05
1.25 3.07E-05 3.35E-05 2.80E-05 1.46E-05
1.50 3.03E-05 3.31E-05 2.75E-05 9.10E-06
1.75 3.08E-05 3.37E-05 2.79E-05 7.21E-06
2.00 3.05E-05 3.34E-05 2.76E-05 7.28E-06
Table C.17: Convergence - Breadth - New Machine - Number of Trials







Table C.18: Convergence - Breadth - New Machine - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.65E-02 3.65E-02 3.64E-02 3.51E-02
1.25 3.65E-02 3.65E-02 3.64E-02 2.54E-02
1.50 3.65E-02 3.66E-02 3.64E-02 2.35E-02
1.75 3.64E-02 3.66E-02 3.63E-02 2.74E-02
2.00 3.64E-02 3.66E-02 3.63E-02 4.12E-02
DB01
1.00 2.35E-02 2.35E-02 2.34E-02 2.29E-02
1.25 2.35E-02 2.35E-02 2.34E-02 1.68E-02
1.50 2.35E-02 2.36E-02 2.34E-02 1.57E-02
1.75 2.35E-02 2.36E-02 2.34E-02 1.86E-02
2.00 2.35E-02 2.36E-02 2.34E-02 2.85E-02
DB02
1.00 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02
1.25 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 1.24E-02 8.98E-03
1.50 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 1.24E-02 8.34E-03
1.75 1.25E-02 1.25E-02 1.24E-02 9.72E-03
2.00 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 1.46E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.26E-05 1.37E-05 1.14E-05 1.26E-05
1.25 1.23E-05 1.35E-05 1.12E-05 5.83E-06
1.50 1.24E-05 1.36E-05 1.12E-05 3.73E-06
1.75 1.23E-05 1.35E-05 1.11E-05 2.98E-06
2.00 1.22E-05 1.33E-05 1.10E-05 2.96E-06
Table C.19: Convergence - Breadth - Public to Private - Number of Trials







Table C.20: Convergence - Breadth - Public to Private - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.53E-02 4.33E-02
1.25 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.53E-02 3.16E-02
1.50 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.53E-02 2.99E-02
1.75 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.52E-02 3.61E-02
2.00 4.54E-02 4.56E-02 4.52E-02 5.76E-02
DB01
1.00 2.90E-02 2.91E-02 2.90E-02 2.82E-02
1.25 2.90E-02 2.91E-02 2.89E-02 2.08E-02
1.50 2.90E-02 2.91E-02 2.89E-02 1.99E-02
1.75 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 2.43E-02
2.00 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 3.93E-02
DB02
1.00 1.53E-02 1.54E-02 1.53E-02 1.51E-02
1.25 1.53E-02 1.54E-02 1.53E-02 1.11E-02
1.50 1.54E-02 1.54E-02 1.53E-02 1.05E-02
1.75 1.53E-02 1.54E-02 1.53E-02 1.26E-02
2.00 1.53E-02 1.55E-02 1.52E-02 1.98E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.87E-05 2.04E-05 1.70E-05 1.87E-05
1.25 1.91E-05 2.08E-05 1.74E-05 9.17E-06
1.50 1.89E-05 2.07E-05 1.72E-05 5.88E-06
1.75 1.88E-05 2.06E-05 1.70E-05 4.84E-06
2.00 1.88E-05 2.06E-05 1.70E-05 5.13E-06
92
Table C.21: Static - Depth - Base Case - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.02E-01 1.63E-01
1.25 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.20E-01
1.50 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.37E-01
2.00 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.03E-01 2.11E-01
DB01
1.00 6.45E-02 6.66E-02 6.23E-02 6.03E-02
1.25 6.48E-02 6.67E-02 6.29E-02 4.71E-02
1.50 6.46E-02 6.65E-02 6.28E-02 4.47E-02
1.75 6.49E-02 6.69E-02 6.29E-02 5.22E-02
2.00 6.46E-02 6.71E-02 6.22E-02 7.67E-02
DB02
1.00 3.25E-02 3.41E-02 3.10E-02 3.15E-02
1.25 3.25E-02 3.38E-02 3.11E-02 2.30E-02
1.50 3.27E-02 3.40E-02 3.14E-02 2.12E-02
1.75 3.24E-02 3.38E-02 3.11E-02 2.33E-02
2.00 3.25E-02 3.41E-02 3.09E-02 3.30E-02
STORAGE
1.00 4.65E-03 5.25E-03 4.05E-03 4.63E-03
1.25 4.63E-03 5.05E-03 4.21E-03 2.28E-03
1.50 4.67E-03 5.00E-03 4.34E-03 1.40E-03
1.75 4.63E-03 4.91E-03 4.36E-03 9.91E-04
2.00 4.62E-03 4.87E-03 4.37E-03 8.24E-04
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Table C.22: Static - Depth - Modify Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.06E-01 2.10E-01 2.02E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.07E-01 2.10E-01 2.04E-01 1.21E-01
1.50 2.07E-01 2.09E-01 2.04E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.37E-01
2.00 2.06E-01 2.10E-01 2.02E-01 2.07E-01
DB01
1.00 7.44E-02 7.67E-02 7.21E-02 6.89E-02
1.25 7.44E-02 7.64E-02 7.24E-02 5.20E-02
1.50 7.44E-02 7.63E-02 7.25E-02 4.83E-02
1.75 7.47E-02 7.68E-02 7.26E-02 5.55E-02
2.00 7.47E-02 7.72E-02 7.22E-02 8.12E-02
DB02
1.00 3.24E-02 3.40E-02 3.09E-02 3.14E-02
1.25 3.24E-02 3.37E-02 3.11E-02 2.29E-02
1.50 3.24E-02 3.36E-02 3.11E-02 2.09E-02
1.75 3.25E-02 3.39E-02 3.12E-02 2.33E-02
2.00 3.25E-02 3.41E-02 3.09E-02 3.25E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.59E-03 1.94E-03 1.24E-03 1.59E-03
1.25 1.58E-03 1.82E-03 1.34E-03 7.74E-04
1.50 1.61E-03 1.80E-03 1.42E-03 4.76E-04
1.75 1.56E-03 1.72E-03 1.40E-03 3.30E-04
2.00 1.58E-03 1.73E-03 1.44E-03 2.78E-04
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Table C.23: Static - Depth - Move Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.04E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.08E-01 2.11E-01 2.04E-01 1.20E-01
1.50 2.07E-01 2.10E-01 2.04E-01 1.14E-01
1.75 2.07E-01 2.10E-01 2.04E-01 1.36E-01
2.00 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.03E-01 2.11E-01
DB01
1.00 6.46E-02 6.68E-02 6.25E-02 6.04E-02
1.25 6.47E-02 6.66E-02 6.28E-02 4.69E-02
1.50 6.46E-02 6.64E-02 6.27E-02 4.45E-02
1.75 6.48E-02 6.68E-02 6.28E-02 5.16E-02
2.00 6.51E-02 6.75E-02 6.27E-02 7.51E-02
DB02
1.00 3.33E-02 3.49E-02 3.17E-02 3.22E-02
1.25 3.30E-02 3.44E-02 3.17E-02 2.32E-02
1.50 3.31E-02 3.44E-02 3.18E-02 2.11E-02
1.75 3.30E-02 3.43E-02 3.16E-02 2.31E-02
2.00 3.28E-02 3.44E-02 3.13E-02 3.18E-02
STORAGE
1.00 4.44E-03 5.02E-03 3.85E-03 4.42E-03
1.25 4.53E-03 4.94E-03 4.11E-03 2.24E-03
1.50 4.45E-03 4.77E-03 4.13E-03 1.35E-03
1.75 4.48E-03 4.75E-03 4.20E-03 9.76E-04
2.00 4.50E-03 4.75E-03 4.25E-03 8.20E-04
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Table C.24: Static - Depth - New Machine - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.07E-01 2.10E-01 2.03E-01 1.64E-01
1.25 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.20E-01
1.50 2.06E-01 2.09E-01 2.03E-01 1.13E-01
1.75 2.07E-01 2.10E-01 2.03E-01 1.37E-01
2.00 2.07E-01 2.11E-01 2.02E-01 2.10E-01
DB01
1.00 6.46E-02 6.68E-02 6.25E-02 6.05E-02
1.25 6.46E-02 6.65E-02 6.27E-02 4.70E-02
1.50 6.48E-02 6.66E-02 6.29E-02 4.49E-02
1.75 6.46E-02 6.66E-02 6.26E-02 5.16E-02
2.00 6.44E-02 6.68E-02 6.20E-02 7.58E-02
DB02
1.00 3.27E-02 3.42E-02 3.11E-02 3.16E-02
1.25 3.25E-02 3.38E-02 3.11E-02 2.29E-02
1.50 3.29E-02 3.41E-02 3.16E-02 2.12E-02
1.75 3.26E-02 3.39E-02 3.13E-02 2.30E-02
2.00 3.29E-02 3.45E-02 3.13E-02 3.27E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.31E-03 3.81E-03 2.81E-03 3.30E-03
1.25 3.32E-03 3.67E-03 2.96E-03 1.62E-03
1.50 3.26E-03 3.53E-03 2.99E-03 9.63E-04
1.75 3.34E-03 3.58E-03 3.11E-03 7.11E-04
2.00 3.29E-03 3.50E-03 3.08E-03 5.77E-04
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Table C.25: Static - Depth - Public to Private - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 2.29E-01 2.33E-01 2.26E-01 1.77E-01
1.25 2.30E-01 2.33E-01 2.27E-01 1.30E-01
1.50 2.30E-01 2.33E-01 2.27E-01 1.25E-01
1.75 2.30E-01 2.33E-01 2.26E-01 1.55E-01
2.00 2.30E-01 2.34E-01 2.26E-01 2.52E-01
DB01
1.00 7.26E-02 7.48E-02 7.03E-02 6.73E-02
1.25 7.26E-02 7.46E-02 7.06E-02 5.25E-02
1.50 7.27E-02 7.47E-02 7.08E-02 5.05E-02
1.75 7.24E-02 7.45E-02 7.02E-02 5.91E-02
2.00 7.24E-02 7.50E-02 6.97E-02 8.99E-02
DB02
1.00 3.60E-02 3.76E-02 3.44E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.62E-02 3.76E-02 3.48E-02 2.57E-02
1.50 3.61E-02 3.75E-02 3.48E-02 2.36E-02
1.75 3.62E-02 3.76E-02 3.47E-02 2.71E-02
2.00 3.62E-02 3.79E-02 3.44E-02 3.91E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.63E-03 4.16E-03 3.10E-03 3.62E-03
1.25 3.62E-03 3.99E-03 3.25E-03 1.79E-03
1.50 3.61E-03 3.90E-03 3.32E-03 1.09E-03
1.75 3.65E-03 3.90E-03 3.40E-03 7.96E-04
2.00 3.58E-03 3.81E-03 3.36E-03 6.58E-04
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Table C.26: Static - Breadth - Base Case - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.59E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.59E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 2.72E-02
2.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 4.10E-02
DB01
1.00 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 2.27E-02
1.25 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.66E-02
1.50 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.84E-02
2.00 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 2.83E-02
DB02
1.00 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 8.90E-03
1.50 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 8.28E-03
1.75 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 9.62E-03
2.00 1.23E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.45E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.15E-05 3.70E-05 2.60E-05 3.15E-05
1.25 3.14E-05 3.51E-05 2.76E-05 1.47E-05
1.50 3.09E-05 3.38E-05 2.79E-05 9.04E-06
1.75 3.16E-05 3.43E-05 2.89E-05 7.48E-06
2.00 3.14E-05 3.41E-05 2.87E-05 7.68E-06
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Table C.27: Static - Breadth - Modify Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.59E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.59E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 2.71E-02
2.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 4.11E-02
DB01
1.00 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 2.27E-02
1.25 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.66E-02
1.50 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 1.84E-02
2.00 2.33E-02 2.34E-02 2.31E-02 2.83E-02
DB02
1.00 1.23E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 8.89E-03
1.50 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.29E-03
1.75 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.22E-02 9.62E-03
2.00 1.23E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.44E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.99E-05 2.42E-05 1.55E-05 1.99E-05
1.25 1.94E-05 2.24E-05 1.65E-05 9.07E-06
1.50 2.03E-05 2.27E-05 1.79E-05 5.93E-06
1.75 1.96E-05 2.17E-05 1.76E-05 4.47E-06
2.00 2.01E-05 2.21E-05 1.80E-05 4.59E-06
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Table C.28: Static - Breadth - Move Connection - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 3.47E-02
1.25 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.51E-02
1.50 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.33E-02
1.75 3.60E-02 3.61E-02 3.58E-02 2.71E-02
2.00 3.60E-02 3.62E-02 3.58E-02 4.10E-02
DB01
1.00 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.30E-02 2.26E-02
1.25 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.66E-02
1.50 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.56E-02
1.75 2.32E-02 2.33E-02 2.31E-02 1.84E-02
2.00 2.32E-02 2.34E-02 2.30E-02 2.85E-02
DB02
1.00 1.24E-02 1.25E-02 1.23E-02 1.22E-02
1.25 1.23E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.90E-03
1.50 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 8.29E-03
1.75 1.24E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02 9.67E-03
2.00 1.23E-02 1.25E-02 1.22E-02 1.44E-02
STORAGE
1.00 3.02E-05 3.56E-05 2.48E-05 3.02E-05
1.25 3.06E-05 3.44E-05 2.69E-05 1.46E-05
1.50 3.03E-05 3.33E-05 2.74E-05 9.12E-06
1.75 3.06E-05 3.33E-05 2.80E-05 7.33E-06
2.00 3.06E-05 3.32E-05 2.80E-05 7.16E-06
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Table C.29: Static - Breadth - New Machine - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 3.65E-02 3.67E-02 3.63E-02 3.51E-02
1.25 3.65E-02 3.66E-02 3.63E-02 2.54E-02
1.50 3.65E-02 3.66E-02 3.63E-02 2.35E-02
1.75 3.65E-02 3.66E-02 3.63E-02 2.74E-02
2.00 3.64E-02 3.66E-02 3.62E-02 4.11E-02
DB01
1.00 2.35E-02 2.37E-02 2.34E-02 2.30E-02
1.25 2.35E-02 2.36E-02 2.34E-02 1.68E-02
1.50 2.35E-02 2.36E-02 2.34E-02 1.57E-02
1.75 2.35E-02 2.37E-02 2.34E-02 1.86E-02
2.00 2.35E-02 2.37E-02 2.34E-02 2.86E-02
DB02
1.00 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 1.23E-02
1.25 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 8.98E-03
1.50 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 8.33E-03
1.75 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 9.70E-03
2.00 1.25E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 1.46E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.14E-05 1.47E-05 8.11E-06 1.14E-05
1.25 1.23E-05 1.46E-05 9.90E-06 5.80E-06
1.50 1.27E-05 1.46E-05 1.08E-05 3.78E-06
1.75 1.20E-05 1.37E-05 1.04E-05 2.85E-06
2.00 1.24E-05 1.41E-05 1.07E-05 3.14E-06
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Table C.30: Static - Breadth - Public to Private - Likelihood & Variance
Machine Amplification Likelihood Upper Lower Variance
FILES
1.00 4.54E-02 4.56E-02 4.52E-02 4.33E-02
1.25 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.52E-02 3.16E-02
1.50 4.54E-02 4.55E-02 4.52E-02 2.99E-02
1.75 4.54E-02 4.56E-02 4.52E-02 3.61E-02
2.00 4.54E-02 4.56E-02 4.52E-02 5.79E-02
DB01
1.00 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 2.82E-02
1.25 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 2.08E-02
1.50 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 1.99E-02
1.75 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 2.43E-02
2.00 2.90E-02 2.92E-02 2.89E-02 3.92E-02
DB02
1.00 1.53E-02 1.55E-02 1.52E-02 1.51E-02
1.25 1.53E-02 1.54E-02 1.52E-02 1.11E-02
1.50 1.54E-02 1.55E-02 1.53E-02 1.05E-02
1.75 1.53E-02 1.54E-02 1.52E-02 1.26E-02
2.00 1.53E-02 1.55E-02 1.52E-02 1.97E-02
STORAGE
1.00 1.90E-05 2.33E-05 1.47E-05 1.90E-05
1.25 1.87E-05 2.16E-05 1.57E-05 8.93E-06
1.50 1.87E-05 2.11E-05 1.64E-05 5.79E-06
1.75 1.92E-05 2.14E-05 1.70E-05 4.92E-06
2.00 1.89E-05 2.11E-05 1.67E-05 5.15E-06
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